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Executive Summary 
The use of conventional trade barriers such as tariffs and import quotas has declined 
significantly since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1948 (WTO, 
2012). It is therefore no surprise that recent economic literature shows that the cost that arises 
from traditional trade barriers is fairly modest; one estimate put the cost to the world 
economy at as low as 1 percent of world GDP (Paul R. Krugman, Obstfeld, & Melitz, 2012). 
Is this to say that barriers have been reduced to such a degree that they no longer impact 
trading economies? Are trade barriers to be thought of as a problem of the past? For most, the 
clear answer to this is no. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the extent to which 
Norwegian products still encounter trade barriers in foreign markets; to measure the relative 
frequency and severity with which barriers occur; and explore the potential effects on 
producers and the broader economy. 
 
Because trade barriers vary widely across markets and industries, I have chosen to focus on 
the case of the Norwegian defense industry vis-à-vis the US market. Limiting the scope of the 
thesis in this way provides in-depth information needed in order to make valuable predictions 
as to the impacts of trade barriers on a particular sector and the broader economy.  
 
Relevant barriers were identified through in-depth interviews with Norwegian government 
officials, representatives from the Norwegian Armed Forces, as well as executives from the 
defense industry. A business survey covering a total of 16 barriers was subsequently 
distributed to the Norwegian defense industry. The data collected from the survey was used 
to assign each barrier two quantitative data points; one related to frequency, and another 
related to severity. Finally, the frequency measure and the severity measure were combined 
to provide a measurement of overall impact.  
 
The data from the survey allowed for a ranking of the barriers that revealed the following 
insights: 
1. In certain cases, there seems to be a discrepancy between regulations and reality. This 
is exemplified by the Buy American Act; which is ranked number 1 according to 
overall impact, but should in reality not apply to Norwegian end products. 
  VI 
2. High-impact barriers can be a bi-product of (more or less) unrelated regulations. This 
is demonstrated in this thesis by how barriers related to the US export control regime 
has a relatively large impact on US imports. 
3. Informal barriers are of great importance. This pertains particularly to the attitudes of 
US industry and governmental procurement officials towards Norwegian defense 
companies. 
The analysis of the survey data also revealed that companies with different levels of 
involvement in the US market assign barriers different overall impact. The data showed that 
it is companies with the most direct involvement in the US that encounter barriers most 
frequently, and that it is the same group that find them most challenging to deal with. 
 
Combining the survey data with economic theory allowed for analysis of the likely effects of 
trade barriers on the defense industry and the broader Norwegian economy. I conclude that 
the barriers negatively impact company revenue and value added, and that this has 
implications for their budget restriction and use of inputs. The extent to which these changes 
are noticeable in the national economy is however likely to be modest, due to the relatively 
small size of the Norwegian defense industry. Barriers also lead to less efficient resource use, 
as companies are denied the opportunity to reap benefits from specialization and economies 
of scale. Lastly, I conclude that there is considerable pressure on the Norwegian defense 
industry to relocate at least parts of their operations to the US. This will likely be beneficial 
in terms of revenue, but has the potential to create a one-way transfer of technology from 
Norway to the US.	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2 
1 The Special Case of the Defense Industry 
The following chapter provides context and motivation for studying trade barriers in markets 
for defense articles. Subchapter 1.1 provides key figures for the Norwegian defense industry, 
both in absolute and relative terms. 1.2 explores this industry’s relationship with the 
Norwegian Government and the Armed Forces and provides insight into why this relatively 
small industry receives the amount of support that it does. Finally, subchapter 1.3 discusses 
the importance of the US market to Norwegian defense companies.  
 
1.1 The Norwegian Defense Industry: Key Figures  
The approximately 120 companies that make up the Norwegian defense industrial base are a 
highly heterogeneous group with little more in common than the fact that they all are 
suppliers to the Norwegian and/or allied Armed Forces (NDRE, 2012). Companies vary in 
size between one-man enterprises to companies with multiple business units and thousands of 
employees. The companies also deliver a wide variety of products and technologies of 
different sophistication levels. This diversity can make aggregate analysis difficult as 
statistics are usually reported by product group. Luckily, the Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment1 (NDRE) provides continuous data on the conditions and standing of the 
industrial base through annual statistical reports. Below follows key figures on employment, 
value added, exports, and research and development (R&D) investments for the Norwegian 
defense industry.  
 
Employment: Defense-related activity supported approximately 4.500 full-time 
equivalent positions in Norway in 2011 (NDRE, 2012). This equaled 0.19 percent of the 
total full-time equivalents across all sectors of the Norwegian economy (SN, 2013b). 
While the defense industry’s contribution to national employment is relatively small, 
defense jobs are to a large extent concentrated in defense-industrial hubs, and are 
therefore of great importance to the local communities where they are situated (NDRE, 
2007). It is important to note that the figures above reflect only work directly related to 
producing defense articles; they consider neither employments for the production of 
dual-use or civilian products within defense companies, nor the spillover effects that 
follow from defense companies’ supply purchases.     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt, or FFI 
3 
 
Value Added: In 2011, the value added (calculated as operating profits plus labor costs) 
by the Norwegian defense industry was $1.03 billion (6 billion NOK) (NDRE, 2012). 
Again, this represents a relatively modest portion (0.29 percent) of the total value added 
by all Norwegian sectors (SN, 2013c). However, while the industry might be small, it is 
characterized by advanced technology and high productivity. This is reflected in the fact 
that the value-added per full-time equivalent in 2011 was approximately $230 000 (1.33 
million NOK) for the defense industry, while the corresponding figure for the 
Norwegian manufacturing sector as a whole was $123 000 (720 000 NOK) (SN, 2013c). 
In addition to direct value added activity, the defense industry creates positive 
externalities in other sectors of the Norwegian economy through purchasing goods and 
services. According to NDRE estimates, the Norwegian defense industry bought goods 
and services worth $550 million (3.2 billion NOK) from other Norwegian companies in 
2011 (NDRE, 2012).  
 
Exports: The total value of defense exports2 in 2011 was approximately $870 million 
(5.06 billion NOK) (NDRE, 2012), which equaled 1.4 percent of the total value of 
traditional exports3 in Norway (SN, 2013a). While defense exports accounts for only a 
small portion of total Norwegian exports, it is worth noting that this share has been 
growing rapidly; at around 15 – 20 percent annually over the past decade (NDRE, 2011). 
Furthermore, exports are of the upmost importance to the defense industry itself. 
According to the NDRE, exports made up as much as 38 percent of the total defense 
industry sales in 2012 (NDRE, 2012). According to the head of the Norwegian Defense 
and Security Industries Association4 (NDSIA), a Norwegian defense industry would not 
be viable without exports (Svensgård, 2013). 
 
The defense industry faces very particular global market settings. Not only do they face 
barriers in foreign markets (which is the focus of this thesis), but restrictions also apply 
at the Norwegian border. Exports of Norwegian defense articles, services, and 
technologies are controlled by the Norwegian government to ensure that such exports are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This total value includes both defense articles subject to export licensing and those that are not.   
3 ‘Traditional exports’ is defined as total exports less exports of crude oil, natural gas, condensates, 
ships, and oil platforms (NDRE, 2011).  
4 Forsvars- og sikkerhetsindustriens Forening, or FSi 
4 
aligned with Norwegian security interests, and to limit the global proliferation of 
military articles (NMFA, 2013a). Additionally, the Norwegian defense industry must 
follow the rules laid down in multinational defense trade agreements such as the 
Wassenaar Agreement (NMFA, 2012) and the recently approved UN Arms Trade Treaty 
(NMFA, 2013b).       
 
Research and Development: Customers in the defense market have very specific and 
often critical needs. To meet the requirements set forth by the customer, defense 
companies need to make considerable R&D-investments. The defense industry is known 
for being knowledge-intensive and innovative, and this is also reflected in empirical 
evidence. According to the NDRE, 53 percent of defense companies undertook direct 
R&D-investments. The corresponding figure for the Norwegian private sector was 12 
percent (NDRE, 2011).  
 
1.2 The Defense Industry and Government: A Unique 
Relationship 
From the data provided above we can conclude that the Norwegian defense industry 
constitutes a relatively small part of the Norwegian economy. Still, the industry receives 
considerable support and attention from the government (NDRE, 2008). The extensive 
support system available to the defense industry comprises programs in multiple Ministries 
including the Ministries of Defense, Trade and Industry, Local Government and Regional 
Development, and Education and Research. Governmental entities focused on business 
promotion, such as the Research Council of Norway, Innovation Norway, the Industrial 
Development Corporation of Norway (SIVA), and the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for 
Export Credits (GIEK) also work to ensure a strong and vibrant defense industry. 
Governmental backing of the defense industry takes many forms, including direct domestic 
procurement, sales promotion through offset arrangements, providing tax incentives, direct 
monetary funding, professional and technical support (NDRE, 2008; NMOD, 2007). The 
Government also works actively to promote the export of Norwegian defense articles 
(NMFA, 2012). This is typically done through marketing, networking, and negotiating 
government-to-government trade promotion agreements. 
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If relative size and contribution to the Norwegian economy cannot explain the broad support 
for the defense industry described above, then what can? One explanation is that industries 
characterized by sophisticated technologies and considerable R&D investments deserve 
additional governmental support because they provide large external benefits for the broader 
economy (NDRE, 2009, 2011). Another, and the more likely explanation, is the inherent 
bond between the defense industry and the Armed Forces. The motivation of the Norwegian 
government in providing support for the defense industry is clearly stated in Report to the 
Storting no. 38 (2006 – 2007), which laid out a comprehensive strategy for using military 
procurement activities as industrial policy. The explicit goals of this strategy were to 1) 
promote value-adding activities in the Norwegian economy, 2) support the further 
development of a competitive defense industry, and 3) ensure that the Armed Forces has 
access to necessary expertise, materiel, and services (NMOD, 2007). It is the latter point, the 
defense industry’s role as supplier to the Armed Forces, which gives the industry a unique 
position in the Norwegian economy. The Armed Forces have concluded that it is neither 
possible nor desirable for them to retain a full range of technical expertise. Industry is 
therefore relied upon to build and retain capabilities in certain technological areas (NDRE, 
2008; NMOD, 2007).  
 
The unique relationship with the Armed Forces ensures that the Norwegian defense industry 
receives considerable support from the Norwegian government. Still, the industry cannot rely 
solely on the Norwegian market. The fact that there is only one domestic end customer, and 
that sales are often made in bulk, makes exports vital to the defense industry. The next 
subchapter explores aspects of the international markets for defense articles by looking at the 
country that receives the largest share of Norwegian defense exports, the United States. 
 
1.3 The International Defense Market’s Biggest Player: 
The United States 
After having discussed the importance of the defense industry to the Norwegian government, 
as well as the importance of exports to the defense industry, it is time to turn to the 
international markets. The reason for choosing to focus on the United States is its 
undisputable importance to the Norwegian defense industry, both in the past, present, and 
future: 
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In the past:  
Norwegian defense industry involvement in the US defense market goes back more 
than a century, and stories of defense trade barriers go back just as far. One example 
is from the 1890s, when then Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk was awarded a contract for 
production of a new US Army rifle. After protests from US competitors and 
Congress, the contract was temporarily placed on hold (USSC, 1901). However, in 
the end, the US Army did adopt Kongsberg’s Krag-Jørgensen rifle as their standard 
arm (Kongsberg, 2013). The Norwegian Government’s history of support for the 
defense industry has a similarly long history, and is exemplified in the 1978 signing 
of the bilateral Memorandum of Understanding concerning research and 
development, production, and procurement of defense equipment (DOD/NMOD, 
1978) and subsequently the related Declaration of Principles in 2002 (DOD, 2002). 
The industrial and governmental relationships that have emerged, the reputations that 
have been built, and the investments that have been made, makes the US-Norwegian 
trade relationship particularly interesting to study.  
 
In the present: 
The US market is currently of great importance to Norwegian defense companies. In 
the years between 2008 and 2011 the US received an average of 37.4 percent of total 
Norwegian defense exports5, for a total value of $966 million (5.6 billion NOK) 
(NMFA, 2012). Figure 1.1 provides an illustration of the relative importance of the 
US market; it shows the dispersion of Norwegian defense exports among some of our 
major defense trading partners for the years 2008 to 2011.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ annual report includes data only on defense articles that require 
export licenses.  
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Figure 1.1 Norwegian defense exports by receiving market, 2008 – 2011, in million NOK
 
Source: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). 
 
In the future: 
The sheer size of the US military expenditure makes it an enormous potential market 
for Norwegian defense exports. Figure 1.2 illustrates this fact. In 2011, US military 
expenditures were greater than those of the next 16 biggest spenders combined, 
implying that the market potential in the US outranks that of any other nation.   
 
Figure 1.2. Military expenditure by country (2011), in constant (2010) USD. 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, 2012)  
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In addition to the absolute importance implied by the size of the market, the US might also 
become a relatively more important market in coming years. The reason for this is the 
adoption and implementation of an EU directive that significantly limits the use of offset-
agreements within the European defense market (NMOD, 2012). Empirical evidence 
suggests that being able to participate such repurchase-agreements is a major success factor 
for Norwegian defense companies (Castellacci & Fevolden, 2012), implying that future 
Norwegian defense exports may pivot towards the US, where such agreements would still be 
permissible.   
  
9 
2 Theory and Empirical Evidence: the 
Economics of Trade Barriers  
 
2.1 The benefits of trade 
According to economic theory, there are two reasons why countries find it beneficial to 
engage in international trade: 1) Differences between countries yield comparative advantages 
that give rise to trade benefits through specialization and 2) Cross-border coordination and 
collaboration can yield economies of scale (Paul R. Krugman et al., 2012). I will explain both 
types of benefit in turn. 
 
David Ricardo developed the theory of comparative advantage in the early 19th century (Paul 
R Krugman, 2008). Simply put, country 1 has a comparative advantage in producing good A 
if the opportunity cost of producing A in terms of other goods is lower in country 1 than in 
other countries. Ricardo showed that trade between two countries can be mutually beneficial 
if each country specializes in, and exports, the good in which they have a comparative 
advantage. A brief numerical example illustrates the concept: consider a production of fighter 
jets and military naval vessels in Norway and the US. Table 2.1 shows the labor required to 
produce one unit of each product in each country. Numbers are for illustrational purposes 
only and do not reflect real-world labor input requirements for this type of production.  
 
Table 2.1. Example: Labor input per unit of output in Norway and the US 
 
 Military Naval Vessels Fighter jets 
Norway 100 110 
The United States 90 80 
 
In this example, the US has an absolute advantage in production of both goods; they can 
produce both fighter jets and naval vessels more efficiently than Norway. Still, Ricardian 
theory predicts that both countries will benefit from specialization and trade. The opportunity 
cost in Norway of producing one military naval vessel in terms of fighter jets is equal to 
100/110 = 0.909, while the same opportunity cost in the US is 90/80 = 1.125. The 
opportunity cost in Norway of producing one fighter jet in terms of military naval vessels is 
equal to110/100 = 1.1, while the same opportunity cost in the US is 80/90 = 0.888. Norway 
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has a comparative advantage in producing military naval vessels and the US has a 
comparative advantage in producing fighter jets. It is straightforward to show that both 
countries can benefit from specializing in the good where they have a comparative advantage: 
if the US wanted one naval vessel and one fighter jet they would need to commit 170 labor 
units under autarky. With trade, and assuming that the price of one military naval vessel is 
one fighter jet, it would be sufficient to spend 160 labor units to produce two fighter jets, and 
then trade one jet for one naval vessel. Conversely, if Norway wanted one naval vessel and 
one fighter jet, they would need to commit 210 labor units if only domestic procurement was 
available. With trade they can use 200 labor units on producing two naval vessels and then 
trade one for a fighter jet. This example clearly shows the efficiency-related benefits of trade; 
we can use less input to produce the same amount of output if countries specialize and trade. 
When trade is restricted, neither the American nor the Norwegian economies can reap these 
benefits. 
 
The second source of benefits from trade arises from economies of scale (Paul R Krugman, 
2008). The concept of economies of scale refers to the notion that production becomes more 
efficient as production volume grows. This typically happens in industries where fixed costs 
are large. In such cases increased production volume implies that the fixed costs are spread 
across a larger number of produced units, thereby lowering the average total production cost 
per unit. Other reasons why economies of scale might be present include the fact that firms 
might be able to buy intermediary goods in bulk (and thus at a lower price), labor and capital 
specialization within the firm might be possible, and labor expertise might increase efficiency 
in production after some time. Diagrammatically, economies of scale are portrayed as a 
decreasing average-cost curve. Figure 2.1 below provides an illustration. If Norway and the 
US each were to produce 5 units of a good, the unit cost would equal 15. However, if 
production is centralized in one location, unit cost is reduced to 10. Clearly, coordinating 
production is beneficial as it allows for a more efficient use of resources.  
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Figure 2.1. Average production cost under economies of scale 
 
Despite these benefits of free trade, we still frequently observe that trade is far from free. The 
next subchapter covers the motivations behind trade restrictions.  
 
2.2 Motivations for restricting trade 
The reasons for imposing trade barriers are many. Some are economic, others social or purely 
political.  The following paragraphs provides a brief overview of the most commonly used 
arguments for trade restriction. 
 
Protecting domestic consumers: Restricting imports or imposing quality standards is 
often defended on the basis of protecting the health and safety of domestic consumers. 
Goods such as medical supplies and foodstuffs are typical examples where this 
argument is applied. This reasoning is often considered legitimate, and trade restrictions 
aimed at protecting health and safety are regularly allowed under international trade 
regimes.  
 
Protecting domestic producers: Governments frequently work to shield domestic 
producers from foreign competition. The argument for doing so is that domestic 
production has positive externalities that benefit the broader economy. Such additional 
benefits include for instance employment, spillovers from technological innovations, or 
in the case of the defense industry; ensuring national security and military capabilities. 
The argument is that protection from international markets is needed in order for these 
potential externalities to be realized. 
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Terms of trade gains: As we will see in subchapter 2.4, trade barriers such as tariffs 
have the potential to change world market prices. For large countries with global market 
power it is possible to use trade policies to lower the price of imports, thereby 
generating a terms of trade6 benefit. While this is a possibility for large countries, 
backlash is likely as trading partners see the price of their exports fall (Paul R. Krugman 
et al., 2012). 
 
Retaliation: Retaliatory trade barriers are put in place in cases where countries 
experience trading partners who are not abiding by the rules of free trade and fair 
competition. Provided there is proof of initial wrongdoing, retaliatory trade barriers are 
allowed under international trade regimes.   
 
Revenue generation: Seeing as certain barriers can represent a considerable source of 
income, governments are incentivized to impose these types of trade restrictions. 
Examples typically include tariffs and import quotas.  
 
2.3 Methods to restrict trade 
There are many types of trade barriers available for governments to use as policy tools. It is 
common to distinguish between tariffs (taxes levied on imports) and non-tariff barriers. 
While the former is well known, it is becoming increasingly less relevant as its use has been 
reduced since the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the late 
1940s. Non-tariff barriers, or NTBs, can refer to all policy measures, other than tariffs, that 
can potentially affect trade in goods (WTO, 2012). This is clearly a very broad definition. 
Within NTBs we find regulatory, procedural, and informal barriers spanning everything from 
import quotas and outright prohibitions, local content requirements and domestic preference 
provisions, to cultural disconnects and informal barriers. Additionally, some barriers are 
(more or less) unintended consequences of other policies. One example that will be cited 
repeatedly in this paper is the effect of the US export control regime on US imports. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 A country’s terms of trade equals the price of its exports divided by the price of its imports. 
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2.4 Basic effects of trade restrictions on prices and 
quantities  
Before looking specifically at the consequences of barriers for the defense industry and the 
broader economy, a review of fundamental economic theory is necessary. I will use two 
specific examples, tariffs and import quotas, to show the basic effects of barriers on prices 
and quantities of traded goods. While examples are provided for only two types of barriers, 
the frameworks can easily be applied to other types of barriers. Barriers that impact the 
relative price of imports will, for instance, have effects that are similar to those of tariffs. 
Likewise, barriers that restrict imported volume in some way will have effects similar to 
those of import quotas.   
 
Example 1: The effects of a tariff 
Tariffs are taxes levied on imports at the border. They make imported goods less competitive 
by raising their price relative to that of domestic goods. If the establishment of a tariff leads 
to no goods being traded, the importing country will be left with surplus demand, while the 
exporting country will have surplus supply of the good. Thus, the price in the importing 
country will rise, and the price in the exporting country will fall. These price movements will 
continue until the difference between the two prices equals the tariff, at which point imports 
are again able to compete and trade is feasible. In short, a tariff drives a wedge equal to the 
tariff between the prices observed in the importing and exporting markets. Figure 2.2 
illustrates the situation described above.  
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Figure 2.2. Effects of a tariff 
 
 
The line DD represents demand for imports while SS represents supply of imports. Under free 
trade, QW would be imported at price PW. Introducing a tariff equal to t causes the quantity of 
imported goods to fall to QT. The price in the importing country rises to PT, while the price 
received by exporters falls to P*T. In the importing market, the price increase causes domestic 
supply to rise and domestic demand to fall, causing an overall reduction in demand for 
imports (move from point 1 to 2). In the exporting market, the price reduction causes 
domestic supply to fall and domestic demand to rise, thereby reducing the overall volume 
available to be exported (move from point 1 to 3).  
 
Figure 2.2 additionally demonstrates who benefits from and who bears the burden of a tariff. 
Higher prices and increased domestic production means that producers in the importing 
country benefit at the expense of consumers and those using imported goods intermediary in 
their own production. The government of the importing country benefits from tariff revenue 
equal to area (PT - P*T) x QT. Countries exporting to this market are hurt by the tariff as it 
causes a reduction in both the amount sold and the price received. Reduced revenue for 
exporters is equal to QW xPW – QT x P*T.  
 
While Figure 2.2 portrays a situation where the rise in price for importers equals the 
reduction in price for exporters, such an even split is rarely observed in the real world. Most 
importing countries are too small to impact world market prices. In cases where small 
countries impose tariffs, it is normally assumed that price adjustments will happen solely in 
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the importing country, without any impact on prices in the exporting country. Given that the 
US is a large country by any measure, it is likely that US actions will be able to impact world 
prices to some degree. Due to the highly particular nature of defense goods pricing, it is 
difficult to speculate further as to what degree US trade policies might impact world prices 
for defense goods. However, it is important to note that US actions are likely to effect the 
world market to a larger extent than most other countries.  
 
Example 2: The effect of import quotas 
While tariffs target price, quotas target volume by placing direct restrictions on the quantity 
of goods that can be imported. Quota regimes are usually implemented by giving some entity 
or entities import licenses. Effects of quotas on price and quantity are similar to those of a 
tariff, and are shown in Figure 2.3 below. Under a free trade regime QW would be imported at 
price PW.  Imposing an import quota restricts the imported volume to QQ, implying that the 
supply curve becomes vertical at this point so that the new supply curve is SCS’. Producers in 
the importing country will have to compensate for the restricted access to imports, which, 
given the domestic supply curve, can only be done if prices in the importing country rise. 
Analogously to the results of a tariff, there is a reduction in both overall demand for imports 
(move from 1 to 2) and overall supply of imports (move from 1 to 3).  
 
Figure 2.3. Effects of an import quota 
  
As under a tariff, domestic producers benefit at the expense of domestic consumers. 
However, unlike the case for tariffs, the government of the importing country does not 
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automatically benefit from an import quota. Instead, the benefit of any price discrepancies 
between countries is accrued by the entity that holds import licenses. Whoever holds these 
licenses can buy goods at reduced price abroad and resell at the higher domestic price. This 
benefit can be reaped by domestic importers, the domestic government, or foreign exporters. 
It is theoretically possible for the latter to increase their overall revenue despite a reduction in 
quantity, depending on the elasticity of demand and whether or not exporters have sufficient 
market power to claim parts of the price increase in the importing country.  
 
2.5 Further effects of trade barriers and empirical 
evidence from the defense market 
The previous subchapter showed how tariffs and import quotas impact prices and quantities 
in the market. This subchapter details further implications trade restrictions may have on 
producers and the broader economy.  
 
Barriers to trade are designed to limit cross-border flow of goods, services and technology. 
Clearly, if barriers work as they are intended to do, they can have considerable impact on 
firms looking to service a protected market, as well as on the domestic industry and economy 
of these firms. This subchapter explores three potential effects of trade barriers; 1) trade 
barrier effects on revenue, value added, and input use, 2) trade barrier implications for the 
efficient use of resources, and 3) trade barrier effects on industry’s localization decisions. 
Each case will be supported references to general economic theory, as well as theory and 
empirical evidence from the defense market in particular. Chapter 4 revisit thes three 
potential effects explored here, and analyze their likely magnitude in light of the results from 
the business survey.    
 
2.5.1 Trade barrier effects on revenue, value added, and input use 
A firm’s revenue and value added (operating profits plus labor costs) are to a large extent 
determined by the demand that exists for their products and technologies. This is of course 
true whether the demand is domestic or foreign. As was shown in figures 2.2 and 2.3, trade 
barriers can reduce the demand for imported goods. In addition, economists have identified 
determinants for import demand that are specific to the defense market. Not surprisingly, 
military needs and foreign policy have been found to be highly important in a nation’s import 
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decisions (Pearson, 1989). Economic considerations such as foreign currency constraints, 
overall defense expenditure, substitution opportunities, and domestic supply have also been 
shown to influence defense imports (Looney, 1989; Mintz, 1986; Pearson, 1989). Recent 
studies have in addition introduced increased home bias in defense procurements (J. P. 
Dunne, Garcia-Alonso, Levine, & Smith, 2002; P. Dunne, Garcia-Alonso, Levine, & Smith, 
2005) and higher relative prices of imported goods (Smith & Tasiran, 2005) as explanations 
for lower demand for defense imports. This recent introduction of home bias and relative 
prices is particularly useful for the analysis of trade barriers. Home bias is in itself a trade 
barrier, and appears, as we shall see, in a large number of the barriers analyzed in this paper. 
Relative prices and trade barriers are linked through the fact that the latter can be designed to 
distort the former. One example is tariffs, as outlined above.  
Basic economic theory tells us that lower demand causes prices and sales volume to drop. A 
shift in demand curves creates excess supply at original prices, resulting in downward 
pressure on prices and a reduction in quantity traded. This translates to a reduction in 
revenues, which in turn can impact a firm’s budget constraint. Figure 2.4 provides an 
illustration: imagine that in a free global market, the firm’s level of revenue implies optimal 
input allocation in point 1; where the isocost (budget) line R1/pA R1/pB, is tangent to the 
isoquant (production level) curve Q1. Here, firms will use A1 of input A and B1 of input B.  If 
the introduction of trade barriers yields a reduction in demand, thus reducing firm revenue, 
we can expect the isoquant to shift inwards to R2/pA R2/pB, implying that the firm will reduce 
their use of inputs and produce less output (Frank, 2008).  	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Figure 2.4. Isocost-lines under reduced revenue 
 
While it is reasonable to expect lower demand to cause a negative shift in the isocost line, it 
is less straightforward to predict exactly what the new input mix will be. In Figure 2.4 this is 
drawn as point 2, but it might as well be any other point along R2/pA R2/pB. This will depend 
on a host of factors, including for instance short-term rigidity in wages and employment, 
capital restraints, or the availability of external R&D funding to replace internal financing. 
The figure above is merely meant as an illustration; predicting firm-level changes in input use 
due to trade barriers would require far more data and resources than are available to me, and 
is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
2.5.2 Trade barrier implications for the efficient use of resources 
Subchapter 2.1 showed that benefits of trade arise due to specialization and economies of 
scale. Trade barriers are costly because they limit the extent to which such potential benefits 
are realized. In general, this cost occurs because resources are used less efficiently when 
trade is restricted. This is true for both specialization and economies of scale; Table 2.1 
showed that a given input yields a lower total volume of output under autarky than under 
specialization and trade. Conversely, Figure 2.1 showed that when trade barriers limit 
production volumes, average costs increase in cases when economies of scale are present. 
This implies a less efficient use of resources; one dollar or unit of one unit of yields less 
output when trade barriers are present (Paul R. Krugman et al., 2012).  
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Empirical evidence from the defense market suggests that efficiency gains from trade through 
specialization and economies of scale could potentially be very large, implying that the cost 
of restricting trade will also be high. In a recent study Hartley uses export data, comparative 
unit prices, and data on economies of scale from defense firms to estimate that the unit cost 
of production would be reduced 10 to 25 percent by increased competition, 10 to 20 percent 
by taking advantage of economies of scale, and 5 percent by economies of learning (Hartley, 
2006). Furthermore, defense economists have argued that gains from specialization in the 
defense market may be larger than in other markets due to the fact that the defense sector is 
characterized by sophisticated technology and widely differentiated products that require a 
similarly wide range of supplies, ingenuity and technology (Hitch & McKean, 1960). 
Maintaining a domestic industrial base that can deliver a broad selection of defense articles 
will therefore require substantial amounts of resources. Specializing according to one’s 
comparative advantage and focusing on building expertise in a limited number of product 
groups can therefore yield great savings. 
 
Additionally, Hitch and McKean (referenced above) argue that there are good reasons to 
believe that gain from economies of scale will be more prominent in the defense industry 
than in most civilian industries. There are several reasons for this. First, the defense industry 
is characterized by large up-front investments; research, development, testing and evaluation 
usually takes years and require substantial investments. Increased production rates will divide 
these up-front investments on a larger number of produced units, thereby driving the unit cost 
of production down. Secondly, in production of platforms and complex defense systems such 
as military aircraft and missiles, producers often experience economies of learning; that is, 
they improve their production processes as they go along (Hitch & McKean, 1960). Limiting 
access to markets and thereby reducing production volumes denies industry the chance to 
take full advantage of such learning curves. 
 
2.5.3 Trade barrier effects on industry’s localization decisions and further 
implications for the broader economy 
In general, companies looking to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI) through 
establishing production in a foreign country must consider the costs and benefits of doing so. 
On one hand, relocating production to the foreign country means that the company can avoid 
trade costs that accrue in transit or at the border. On the other hand, establishing operations in 
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a new market is costly as it implies incurring fixed costs from starting operations. Companies 
will choose to establish production in a foreign country if the savings from circumvention of 
trade costs is greater than the investments needed to establish production in the foreign 
market (Paul R. Krugman et al., 2012): 
 ! ∗ ! > ! 
 
Where ! equals units sold in the foreign market, ! equals trade cost per unit, and ! equals 
fixed costs related to establishing new production facilities in the foreign country. A deciding 
factor is clearly the cost of trade; higher trade costs means increased likelihood of foreign 
production being the most profitable option. Trade barriers increase the cost of trade t, as 
exporters either need to devote resources to circumvent barriers, or face a direct reduction in 
sales or revenue. Thus, an increase in trade barriers gives companies greater incentives to 
relocate production to the protected markets.  
 
There exists a large body of literature on the potential implications of companies moving 
production (entirely or in parts) from the home country to a foreign market. The following 
bullet points give a brief overview of the potential effects most relevant to the Norwegian 
defense industry: 
• Effects on sales and profits: We can assume that relocation of operations on average 
is beneficial for a firm, as they undertake such activities voluntarily. More 
specifically, firms benefit because they can take advantage of larger markets, closer 
proximity to the customer, potential economies of scale, international differences in 
factor endowments, and lower trade costs (Kokko, 2006). The positive impact foreign 
investment can have on profitability has been shown multiple times in economic 
literature (Benvignati, 1983; Pagoulatos & Sorensen, 1976). This is not to say, 
however, that profits would not be even higher if trade barriers were eliminated. In 
addition, there is no guarantee that an increase in profitability for firms will translate 
into benefits for the home economy. Firstly, firms with foreign operations have great 
flexibility in where they invest any additional profits, and the current business 
environment (tax rates, infrastructure, labor quality etc.) is likely to influence the 
extent to which profits are reinvested in the home country (Kokko, 2006). Secondly; 
even in cases where profits are reinvested in the home country, there is no guarantee 
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that the broader economy would benefit substantially. One example is defense R&D 
investments, which according to broad empirical evidence does not seem to stimulate 
civilian R&D to a noticeable degree (Frank R Lichtenberg, 1995), has very limited 
effect on technical change or the formation of technical skills in the economy 
(Chakrabarti & Anyanwu, 1993), and does generally not produce a discernible effect 
on broader industrial productivity (Frank R. Lichtenberg, 1989).  
 
• Effects on domestic employment: A common concern is that establishing production 
abroad will hurt domestic employment. Much of the available empirical evidence 
suggests that home country operations become less labor-intensive as firms invest or 
move operations abroad (Kokko, 2006). Studies of Swedish and Japanese companies 
offer an interesting exception; these countries have seen labor intensity of parent 
companies increase as firms invest or move operations abroad. One possible 
explanation is that foreign-based operations require additional supervisory resources, 
and that these are placed in the home country. While the empirical evidence on the 
effect of relocations on domestic employment is somewhat inconsistent, most 
economists agree that the best option is to allow for trade and free relocation of 
operations, and then compensate those who might suffer under job losses (Paul R. 
Krugman et al., 2012). The economic importance of job loss will also depend on the 
current state of the home economy. In countries where labor is in high demand, 
relocating jobs abroad might seem less detrimental than in countries suffering from 
high unemployment.   
 
• Effects on technology transfers: One of the benefits of investing abroad is the 
possibility of bringing new technologies and experience back to the home country 
(Kokko, 2006). While this is a perfectly valid assumption for most industries, the 
defense industry is a special case when it comes to technology transfers. Most 
countries impose strict export control regimes for defense articles and technologies. 
This makes it difficult to bring new technologies from the host to the home country, 
but also means that technologies transferred from the home to the host country may 
not be easily re-exportable, causing home country technologies to become ‘stuck’ in 
the host country. This results in a one-way transfer of technology, and limits the 
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ability of parent companies to leverage technical investments made in a foreign 
affiliate (Decision/US-Crest, 2009).   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the pressure to reallocate defense production to the US is 
high. A comprehensive study from 2009 explored the different strategies adopted by 
European defense firms servicing the US market (Decision/US-Crest, 2009). The study 
concluded that the only strategy that has proven capable of generating sustainable business in 
the US is indeed one of establishing US-based operations with a high degree of independence 
from the European parent company. The study emphasizes that while this strategy generally 
yields considerable revenue for the parent company, it also leads to a loss of control over 
technology. 
This chapter outlined the economic theory of the benefits of trade and some of the likely 
effects of trade barriers. While the economic theory referenced in this chapter suggests the 
general direction of effects from trade barriers, not much can be said about the actual 
existence or magnitude of these effects without detailed information on relevant barriers, how 
they are implemented, how frequently firms encounter them, and how much resources are 
needed to circumvent them. Providing such information for the Norwegian defense industry 
vis-à-vis the US market is the goal of this thesis. The next chapter details the methodology 
used to attain this information.  
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3 Methodology 
Clearly, the occurrence of trade barriers will vary across industries. Industry-specific analyses 
can therefore be very helpful in understanding the potential consequences of barriers. The 
following chapter explains the methodology used in this thesis to attain such information on 
the occurrence and severity of barriers in the defense industry.   
 
3.1 Choice of Methodology: Business Survey 
It became clear early on that data on the occurrence and severity of trade barriers faced by 
Norwegian defense companies in the US market was not readily available. Global databases, 
published reports, and academic papers did not provide sufficient information. For this 
reason, a business survey was chosen as the most appropriate method for collecting the data 
needed for analysis. In addition to providing basic data, a business survey captures cultural, 
informal, and covert barriers, thus providing far more nuance than would have been possible 
by looking only at trade data and formal rules and regulations.  
 
While business surveys provide useful information, they admittedly have many analytical 
issues. Firstly, information collected through surveys will in large extent be based on human 
experiences and therefore be prone to biases, personal agendas or faulty memory. Secondly, 
surveys rarely see perfect response rates, which is problematic for two reasons; firstly, non-
response reduces the amount of information collected, which is naturally undesirable. 
Secondly, non-response can create a bias problem if respondents are substantially different 
from non-respondents. For example, if larger companies have a greater tendency to respond 
than smaller companies, then the results from a survey will mirror to a greater extent the 
experiences of large companies, and thus misrepresent the experience of the population. 
Comments on the existence of biased non-responsiveness in this project can be found in 3.3. 
While the use of surveys can be analytically challenging, it is still the be best choice of 
methodology for this project as it provides access to detailed and nuanced information on the 
barriers in question.   
 
3.2 Creating the Survey 
The first step was to identify the relevant barriers. This was done through qualitative 
interviews held in January 2013. The interviews covered a total of 13 individuals from the 
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Norwegian defense industry, Innovation Norway, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense, and 
the Norwegian Armed Forces. Based on these interviews, 16 relevant trade barriers were 
identified. A basic overview is given in Box 3.1 below. The survey asked companies to report 
any barriers that had not been covered by the survey. The fact that very few did so implies 
that the in-depth interview process did a good job of identifying the relevant barriers.  
 
The next step was deciding on the type of questions to ask. Recall that the theory in Chapter 2 
laid out the impact of barriers on prices, exported volume, and firm revenue. It might 
therefore seem appropriate to ask firms to provide quantitative estimates of for instance 
monetary loss, unrealized potential, or reduced export volume they have experienced due to 
trade restrictions. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that such quantitative estimates are 
likely unobtainable. Fischer hypothesized that since firms are the entities subjected to 
barriers, it would be reasonable to expect company executives to be able to estimate the 
monetary loss or reduced export volume experienced due to trade restrictions. (Fischer, 
2003). However, it became clear that company executives were not at all able to provide such 
information. Fisher’s results, combined with the expected negative correlation between 
survey question complexity and response rates, led to the decision not to ask companies for 
quantitative cost estimates. Instead, the survey consisted of questions firms were more likely 
able to answer, and was organized so that the results could be studied in a manner analogous 
to risk analysis. Risk is commonly evaluated as the product of a) the likelihood of an event 
occurring and b) the impact severity of the event, should it occur (Ayyub, 2003). Inline with 
this, participants were asked two questions per barrier; one that measured frequency, and 
another that captured severity (question a. and b. in Box 3.2, respectively). Given the 
unavailability of direct quantitative estimates, measures of frequency and severity appear to 
me to be the best data currently obtainable. This data allows for a complete ranking of the 
barriers and can, when combined with economic theory, be a good indicator of potential 
impact of trade barriers on the Norwegian defense industry and the broader Norwegian 
economy.  
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Box 3.1. The barriers 
 
 
1. The Buy American Act (BAA) 
The Buy American Act (41USC Sec.8301 to 8305) instructs US government 
procurement officials to acquire end products from US sources exclusively, unless 
some exception applies. The BAA includes several provisions; some that 
completely ban foreign procurement, others that establishes local content 
requirements, and others still that distorts relative prices in favor of domestic 
firms.   
 
2. Product-Specific Domestic Sourcing Restrictions 
Laws that allow US procurement officials to give preference to specific products 
made in the US. Examples of products include textiles, specialty metals, and 
foodstuffs. 
 
3. Usage of ‘no foreign participation’ clauses 
The US operates with a system of markings that can restrict documents from being 
released to non-US persons. Examples of restricted documents can be bid or 
contract documents, technical specifications or data packages, calls for tender, etc. 
Industry days and websites can also be made inaccessible for non-US persons. 
 
4. Security Clearance Requirements 
Procurement officials can require that companies bidding for a DOD contract hold 
a certain level security clearance (DPAP, 2011). This can be an issue because 
requiring participants to hold a US security clearance effectively excludes most 
non-US companies. 
 
5. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States 
This committee’s approval is needed in order to complete business transactions 
(typically mergers or acquisitions) that can lead to non-US persons gaining control 
of a US company. 
 
6. Traditional trade barriers: tariffs and quotas 
Taxes levied on imported products or restrictions on the amount of products that 
can be brought into the US. 
 
7. Export Control 1: Re-exportability 
US government approval is required in advance of any transfer of defense-articles 
out of the US, even in cases where the product or technology is of non-US origin 
and the transfer is back to the originating country. Non-US products and 
technology can therefore become ‘trapped’ in the US after being brought into the 
country. 
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8. Export Control 2: Licenses to export information and technical data 
The US Export Control Regime considers any cross-border transfer of military 
technology or technical data to be an export of defense material, implying that one 
would need approval from the US government to do so. Denied or restricted 
access to technical data needed to compete for a contract will complicate the bid 
process for Norwegian companies. Furthermore, export license requirements make 
Norwegian companies less attractive business partners for US industry because 
government authorization must be in place in advance of any technical 
discussions. 
 
9. Export Control 3: Obtaining products and supplies  
Problems of obtaining US products and supplies are commonly referred to as 
releasability-issues, and will typically occur when a Norwegian company wishes 
to test, adapt, or do integration work on US products at a Norwegian facility, or 
when the inclusion of certain US parts is a contract requirement. 
 
10. Export Control 4: Third party transfers and third country nationals 
The export control regime prohibits re-selling products of US origin or with US 
parts. This limits the potential market for Norwegian products with integrated US 
parts, and hinders Norwegian companies from including Dual Nationals (DN) or 
Third Country Nationals (TCN) in projects that involve ITAR-restricted articles. 
 
11. Set-asides 
A considerable amount of government procurement contracts are awarded 
exclusively to certain types of companies. The DOD implements multiple set-
aside programs, most of which set specific requirements to the nationality of 
owners and managers (DAU, 2013) 
 
12. Lack of will or knowledge 
Given the complex and ever-changing nature of the US procurement process, it is 
not impossible that procurement professionals (whether in a governmental agency 
or in a private company) will not have sufficient knowledge about the possibility 
of procuring defense related articles from non-US sources. Some procurement 
officials might also lack the willingness to look abroad for procurement 
alternatives.  
 
13. Lack of certainty and clarity 
The US laws and regulations pertaining to trade in defense articles are complex 
and vast. There are a large number of different acquisition regulations pertaining 
to different levels of government. Furthermore, the regulatory system creates 
uncertainty when rules themselves are vague, open for interpretation, or 
conflicting. Navigating the regulatory landscape can therefore be challenging, 
time-consuming, and costly. 
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Box 3.2. Example from the survey: The Buy American Act 
 
 
Barrier 1/16. Domestic Sourcing Restriction: Buy American Act 
The Buy American Act allows US procurement officials to give preference to goods and 
services produced within the United States. (41 United States Code §10a – 10d) 
 
a. Has your company encountered the Buy American Act when looking to do 
business on the US market? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not 
applicable' in question b, 
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if 
you have encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the 
most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, 
and/or direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
 
14. US defense industry 1: Positioning and leveraging 
It is naturally the case that US defense companies will have incentives to try to 
limit international competition in order to improve their own standing in the 
marketplace. 
 
15. US defense industry 2: Excessive caution related to foreign entities 
The US’s strict export control regime leads US defense companies to be 
excessively cautious in dealing with foreign entities. 
 
16. The US Congress 
The influence of Members of the US Congress on the market for defense products 
is three-fold; firstly, Congressional authorization is needed to start, continue, 
expand, or terminate any DOD activity, including procurement programs. 
Secondly, funding for these activates is authorized through the Congressional 
appropriation process. Lastly, Congress is responsible for creating procurement 
policies and the rules and regulations that govern trade in defense articles (Heniff, 
2008). Through these three channels, Congress determines the framework the 
defense industry must operate within. 	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The business survey consisted of three parts; Part I covered general business characteristics. 
Part II asked questions about each of the 16 identified barriers. Part III concluded the survey 
by asking a few more open-ended questions. The complete survey can be found in Appendix 
1.  
 
The survey was assembled using the University of Oslo’s online questionnaire (‘Nettskjema’) 
and was distributed to a total of 95 Norwegian defense companies. In line with other 
academic publications7, the population of Norwegian defense companies was defined as 
companies holding memberships in the Norwegian Defense and Security Industries 
Association8 (NDSIA), of which there are 119 in total (NDSIA, 2012). A small number of 
firms were removed from the population because they were not producers of defense articles. 
This decision is consistent with recent academic publications on the Norwegian defense 
industry9. Some companies were also removed to avoid double counting, as they were 
subsidiaries of larger companies.  
 
A letter encouraging members to complete the survey was sent out from NDSIA leadership in 
advance of the distribution of the survey itself.  The survey was sent out on February 6th 
2013. Reminders were sent out via email February 15th 2013. The form was closed for 
submissions on March 15th 2013.  
 
3.3 Gathering and analyzing the results 
The survey was distributed to a total of 95 Norwegian defense companies. 33 companies 
responded to the survey, which corresponds to a response rate of 35 percent. Response rates 
of this level are not uncommon for business surveys. Provided that any biased non-
responsiveness is adjusted for, a survey with a 35 percent response rate can be used to draw 
conclusions valid for a broader population (Groves, 2006).  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See for instance (Castellacci & Fevolden, 2012) and (Blom, Castellacci, & Fevolden, 2013)  
8 In Norwegian; Forsvars- og Sikkerhetsindustriens forening, FSi 
9 See for instance (NDRE, 2011) 
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3.3.1 Adjusting for biased non-responsiveness 
Biased non-responsiveness can, as explained in 3.1, be a considerable challenge when 
working with surveys. The data collected through the survey showed moderate differences in 
response rates across subgroups, and thus post-survey adjustment became necessary. Table 
3.1 provides details on response rates across three company characteristics; size, main 
product group, and export propensity.  
 
Table 3.1. Response rates across subgroups  
Characteristic / subgroup Response Rate 
Size  
Small (1 – 19 employees) 29.3 % 
Medium (20 – 99 employees) 40.7 % 
Large ( ≥100 employees) 37.0 % 
Main Product Classification  
C –  Manufacturing 40.9% 
M – Professional, scientific and technical activities  45.5% 
G – Wholesale, retail trade; repair of vehicles, motorcycles 21.1% 
J –  Information and communication 33.3% 
N – Administrative and support service activities 0.0% 
Q – Human health and social work activities 0.0% 
Export Activity  
Exporters 42.4 % 
Non-exporters 30.6 % 
Sources: Survey results, proff.no, Brønnøysund Register Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs annual report on 
export of Norwegian defense articles (Eksport av forsvarsmateriell fra Norge). 
 
From the table above we can see that small companies, companies with main product 
classification G, J, N and Q, as well as non-exporters were moderately underrepresented 
among respondents. Note that the 0 percent response rate for product categories N and Q is 
not as critical as it might appear, as these two product groups only account for a total of 5 
companies. Since bias nonresponse can yield bias estimations, post-survey adjustments were 
required. A frequently used adjustment technique is weighting based on auxiliary 
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information10. The specific weighting technique used in this thesis is stratification, a method 
where the population is divided into different non-overlapping strata, all of which are 
assigned a weight according to their degree of over- or under-representation (Bethlehem, 
Cobben, & Schouten, 2011). One strata would for instance be companies who are small, with 
main product classification M, and are non-exporters. Another covers companies who are 
small, fall within the main product classification M, but are exporters, etc. Respondents in 
underrepresented groups are given a weight greater than 1 and respondents in 
overrepresented group are given a weight smaller than 1.  
 
3.3.2 Further adjustments 
In a few (3) instances, respondents answered that they had not met a barrier, but subsequently 
went on to describe actions taken to resolve the issue. In order to increase the consistency of 
the data, I have chosen to assign the value “yes” to any respondent who reports taking 
action(s) to resolve a barrier. Again, this only pertains to a very modest number of instances.  
 
3.4 Creating measures of frequency, severity, and overall 
impact 
Chapter 4 will report results along two dimensions; frequency and severity. The details of 
computing a frequency measure, severity measure, and overall impact is described in the 
following paragraphs.  
  
The frequency measure:  
A measure of frequency was computed for each barrier in the following manner: 
 !! = !!!!,!!!!!! !!!!!!!  
 
Where ! = 1, 2,… , 16  denotes the 16 barriers, and ! = 1, 2,… , 33 denotes the respondents. !! represents the weight given to company i through the stratification process. !!,!, will take 
the value 1 if company ! encountered barrier k and 0 otherwise. The denominator scales the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Auxiliary information here means information that is available for both respondents and non-
respondents. In this thesis firm size, main product classification, and export activity is used as 
auxiliary variables.  
31 
results such that the frequency !!becomes unity if all companies have encountered barrier ! 
(!!,! = 1 for all !).  
 
The severity measure: 
Since frequency alone is not necessarily a good indicator of overall impact, it was important 
to incorporate some measure of severity. This was done by using data from the second 
question on each barrier; see Question b in Box 3.2. For each barrier encountered, firms were 
asked to check all boxes describing actions taken to resolve the issue. The actions were 
ranked according to severity and given a corresponding numerical score. Table 3.2 below 
gives the details on this severity scale.  
 
Table 3.2. Possible actions to resolve barrier ranked by severity 
Severity score (!) Action (!) 
1 point Issue was solved on its own/with time 
2 points Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
3 points Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal 
support, and/or direct negotiations with customer or US 
government entity 
4 points Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, 
Department of Defense, (including CTO or Military Services), 
Congress) 
5 points Issue was solved with Norwegian government support (e.g. the 
Armed Forces, Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or the 
Norwegian Embassy in Washington, DC) 
6 points Issue was brought to court 
7 points Issue remains unsolved 
8 points Project was terminated 
 
The measure of severity was computed in the following manner: 
 !! = !!!!,!( !!,!,!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!,! !!!!!!!!!!!  
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Where, again, ! = 1, 2,… , 16  denotes the 16 barriers; ! = 1, 2,… , 33 denotes the 
respondents, and !! represents the weight given to company i; ! = 1, 2,… , 8 represents the 8 
different actions listed in Table 3.2. !!,!,! will take the value 1 if company ! took action ! 
when encountering barrier k and 0 otherwise. !! refers to the severity point system. In this 
thesis !! = ! for all !, but other choices are of course possible, a point to which I will return 
below. The denominator scales the results such that the severity !! becomes unity if all 
companies that encounter barrier ! takes all (8) actions. 
 
A measure of overall impact: the Final Score 
Finally, !! and !! were combined to produce a one-dimensional measure of overall impact, 
the Final Score (!"). This score is calculated by multiplying the frequency measure and the 
severity measure: !!! = !! ∗ !! 
 
The construction of the severity measure is worth dwelling on, as choices made clearly 
influence the results. Subjectivity enters the severity measure described above in two ways: 
1) through the choice of ranking of the actions and 2) by the assigning of points to each 
action. The ranking of the actions was done based on information collected in the pre-survey 
in-depth interviews, and thereby reflects the experience of individuals who are familiar with 
the usual progression and escalation in this market. Therefore, the results suggest that the 
ranking of actions given above mirrors real-world experiences reasonably well.  
 
Assuming that the ranking of the actions is accurate, tests were performed to determine 
whether or not the constructed FS-ranking was sensitive to the choice of severity points. This 
testing revealed that changing the point system had a very limited effect on the overall FS-
ranking. Assigning ‘project was terminated’ 12 points instead of 8, for instance, left 10 of the 
16 barriers with an unchanged ranking. The remaining 6 shifted no more than 1 place. Similar 
results were found when assigning ‘issue remains unresolved’ less influence, or ‘support 
from US entity’ and ‘support for Norwegian government’ a higher score.  This implies that 
the results found in this project are robust and not sensitive to minor methodological changes.  
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4 Results 
Data from the survey was quantified and aggregated to provide estimates of the overall 
impact of each individual barrier. This chapter presents these results. Subchapter 4.1 provides 
a complete ranking of the barriers according to overall impact, as well as an analysis on 
whether or not impact differs across sub-groups according to companies’ current degree of 
involvement in the US market. Subchapter 4.2 ties the survey results to the theoretical and 
empirical discussion in Chapter 2 by looking at likely effects barriers have on the Norwegian 
defense industry and the Norwegian economy.  
 
4.1 Aggregate Survey Results 
4.1.1 Barriers ranked by overall impact 
The survey contained questions on the barriers along two dimensions; frequency and severity. 
From this information it was possible to assign three basic data point to each barrier; a 
severity measure !!, a frequency measure !!, and a Final Score, !!!. The Final Score is the 
product of the severity measure and the frequency measure, and can, as explained in Chapter 
3, be seen as analogous to calculations of risk. For further details on calculating !! and !!, 
see chapter 3. Table 4.1 below lists the barriers by their Final Score.  
 
Table 4.1. Barriers ranked according to Final Score 
 
Rank Barrier 
1 The Buy American Act 
2 Export Control 3: Obtaining products and supplies 
3 Lack of will or knowledge 
4 Export Control 2: Licenses to export information and 
technical data 
5 US Industry 1: Positioning and leveraging 
6 US industry 2: Excessive caution related to foreign 
entities 
7 Lack of certainty and clarity 
8 Product-specific domestic sourcing restrictions 
9 Usage of ‘no foreign participation’ clauses 
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10 Set-asides 
11 Export Control 4: Third Party Transfers and Third 
Country Nationals 
12 Security clearance requirements 
13 Export Control 1: Re-exportability 
14 The US Congress 
15 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS) 
16 Traditional trade barriers: tariffs and quotas 
 
A few general observations can be made at this point: 
 
• Theory and practice is not always aligned: The Buy American Act (BAA) is still 
a major obstacle  
The BAA is designed to protect and promote domestic industry by restricting US 
Federal procurement to US-origin articles only. The BAA includes measures such as 
complete bans of foreign procurement, local content requirements, as well as price 
distorting measures. The BAA should, however, not be applied to defense related end 
products from Norway. The reason for this is the existence of a reciprocal defense 
procurement memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the Norwegian and 
United States governments in which both countries agree to remove barriers to trade 
in defense supplies or services. This is clearly stated in US law; section 225.872-1 of 
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS):  
 
“225.872-1  General.(a)  
As a result of memoranda of understanding and other international agreements, 
DoD has determined it inconsistent with the public interest to apply restrictions of 
the Buy American statute or the Balance of Payments Program to the acquisition 
of qualifying country end products from the following qualifying countries: 
 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
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Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.” 
 
Given the existence of the MoU, Norwegian companies should in theory not 
encounter this barrier very often. It is therefore surprising that the BAA is ranked 
number one according to overall impact. There are several plausible explanations to 
this; firstly, it might be the case that companies consider any regulation favoring US-
origin products as a part of the BAA, thereby overestimating the frequency with 
which the barrier occurs. Secondly, and perhaps more worrisome, lack of familiarity 
with the MoU may lead US procurement officials to apply the BAA inappropriately, 
and can leave Norwegian companies unable to argue their case when faced with the 
BAA. 
 
• Restrictions on US exports impact US imports 
Norwegian industry frequently cite the US export control regime to be one of the 
most challenging barriers they encounter. This is reflected in the ranking above, 
where barriers related to US export control occupy 2 of the top 5 spots. Since it is not 
apparent how restrictions on products leaving the US impact those bringing products 
into the US, a brief explanation is appropriate. Problems related to the US export 
control regime arise in large part from the US definition of ‘defense exports’. Under 
US law, cross-border movement of any defense or aerospace related article (from 
highly sensitive military products, to nuts and bolts, as well as technical details and 
data) counts as an export of defense material. Certain such exports are prohibited; 
others require licenses or other official approval from the US government. Typically, 
this causes problems for non-US companies who need US-origin defense articles for 
testing or integration, or in cases where the inclusion of US-origin parts is a contract 
requirement (see barrier ranked number 2 above). The export control regime also 
complicates cross-border collaboration by regarding any transfer of technical details 
as an export (see barrier ranked number 6 above). This implies that US Government 
approval needs to be present in advance of any technical discussions between private 
entities. The process of obtaining defense export permissions is costly, time 
consuming, and can significantly weaken the competitiveness of Norwegian defense 
companies in the US market.    
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• Informal barriers have high relative impact 
A final point of interest is the fact that 4 of the top 10 barriers are informal. Of 
particular interest is the fact that 2 of the top 6 barriers are related to actions taken by 
the US defense industry. The very real impact of informal barriers on trade has been 
proven time and again in economic literature (Cheptea & Huchet-Bourdon, 2007; 
Gehrt, Lotz, Shim, Sakano, & Onzo, 2005; Khan, Yusuf, Bokhari, & Aziz, 2005; 
Samiee & Mayo, 1990; Vakulchuk, Irnazarov, & Libman, 2011).  
 
An alternative illustration that highlights the contributions of frequency and severity to the 
individual barrier’s final score is provided in Figure 4.1. Each marker represents a barrier, 
where frequency is measured along the x-axis and severity is measured along the y-axis. The 
horizontal and vertical lines represent average severity and frequency, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.1. Barrier scatter plot: frequency and severity
 
The mapping of barriers provided above contains valuable information on the perception of 
overall severity of barriers among all respondents. However, it is likely that different 
subgroups of respondents will rank barriers differently, both in terms of severity and 
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frequency. The next subchapter explores whether or not companies with varying involvement 
in the US market experience barriers differently.  
 
4.1.2 Subgroup analysis 
Different companies have vastly different experiences on the US market. This is exemplified 
by the span between the company who reported encountering the most barriers (14 barriers 
total) and the companies who reported facing the least amount of barriers (0 barriers). In this 
subchapter I explore whether or not current level of involvement in the US market plays a 
deciding factor in the ranking of barriers. That is, I consider whether frequency and severity 
scores differ between the following three subgroups: 1) companies who operate own 
production lines in the US, either through green-field investments or acquisitions, 2) 
companies that service the US market remotely through exports or a licensing agreement, and 
3) companies who are exploring the possibility of entering the US market. It might appear 
counterintuitive to include Subgroup 3, as it can seem implausible that companies not 
currently active in the market have encountered trade barriers.  However, in the defense 
market, it is common for companies to face trade barriers even during an initial exploratory 
phase. The occurrence of early phase barrier encounters is evident from the survey data; 
companies in Subgroup 3 did report meeting multiple barriers on average.  
 
A brief comment on the expectations we might have as to which companies face barriers 
more often, and which find them most severe, is appropriate. One would expect companies 
with a higher degree of involvement to face barriers more frequently due to their closeness to 
the market. Expectations about which companies will assign barriers the highest severity-
score is less straightforward. One could for instance hypothesize that companies with less 
direct involvement will assign higher severity scores because these companies lack the 
experience and organizational structures to effectively circumvent barriers. Alternatively, it 
might be the more involved firms that report higher severity-scores. If the latter is the case, 
one can ask whether the higher level of resources committed (recall that the survey asked 
firms about actions taken, which could reflect both the severity of a barrier, and resources 
available to deal with barriers) is due to a) that these companies find barriers more 
challenging to deal with or b) that these companies are on average larger, and may have more 
resources available.  
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Before we turn to the results from the subgroup analysis, it is useful to note a few 
characteristics about each subgroup.  
 
Subgroup 1 - Respondents with production in the US: This group comprises 8 companies, 
or 24 percent of respondents. Companies in this group are relatively large on average; 5 out 
of 8 are large companies (companies with ≥ 100 employees), while 3 out of 8 are small 
companies (1 – 19 employees). 6 of 8 companies fall within the main product group 
‘industry’, the remaining two fall under ‘wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles’.  
 
Subgroup 2 - Respondents that service the US market remotely: This group comprises 9 
companies, or 27 percent of respondents. Subgroup 2 is more diverse than Subgroup 1; 2 out 
of 9 companies are large (companies with ≥ 100 employees), 4 are medium-sized (20 – 99 
employees), while 3 are small companies (1 – 19 employees). 6 of the 9 companies belong to 
the main product group ‘industry’, while ‘wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles’, ‘Professional, scientific and technical activities’, and ‘Information and 
communication’ each account for one company.	  	  
 
Subgroup 3 - Respondents exploring the possibility of entering the US market: This 
group comprises 10 companies, or 30 percent of respondents. 2 out of 9 are large companies 
(companies with ≥ 100 employees), 5 are medium-sized (20 – 99 employees), while 3 are 
small companies (1 – 19 employees). 6 of the 10 companies belong to the main product group 
‘industry’, while ‘wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles’, ‘public 
administration and defense; compulsory social security’, and ‘Information and 
communication’ each account for one company.	   
 
Table 4.2 summarizes differences across subgroups. 
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics, subgroup analysis 
 Full 
Respondent 
Group 
Subgroup 1: 
Production 
in the US 
Subgroup 2: 
Servicing the 
US market 
remotely 
Subgroup 3: 
Considering 
entering the US 
market 
Average 
frequency score 
across barriers 
0.23 0.47 0.28 0.17 
Average severity 
score across 
barriers 
0.16 0.20 0.10 0.08 
Average Final 
Score across 
barriers 
0.03 0.09 0.04 0.02 
 
The subgroup analysis confirms the expectation that companies with greater involvement in 
the US market encounter trade barriers more frequently than companies with lower degrees 
of involvement; for 11 of the 16 barriers Subgroup 1 report the highest frequency score. 
Table 4.2 also shows that the highest severity-scores are in fact given by the highly involved 
companies; Subgroup 1 reports the highest severity score for 13 of the 16 barriers. Thus, the 
data thus does not seem to support the hypothesis that firms with fewer investments in the US 
find barriers more difficult to deal with due to lack of experience. Do companies in Subgroup 
1 report higher severity scores because their encounters are in fact more challenging, or 
simply because they are able to devote more resources to solving these issues? If the latter 
was the case, and companies in the different subgroups found barriers equally difficult to 
circumvent, we would expect to see companies in Subgroups 2 and 3 to be forced to ‘give up’ 
more often than companies in Subgroup 1 due to lack of resources. That is, we would expect 
a higher frequency of project terminations in Subgroups 2 and 3 than in Subgroup 1. There is 
however, no support for this in the data. In fact, compared to the total number of barriers met, 
companies in Subgroups 2 and 3 reported a lower proportion of project terminations than the 
companies in Subgroup 1. Thus, the data seems to suggest that companies with higher 
degrees of involvement in the US market not only encounter barriers more frequently, but 
that barrier issues are more costly to deal with for this group than others.  
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4.2 Economic effects of barriers to trade in the defense 
market 
Chapter 2 discussed theory and empirical evidence related to the impact of trade barriers on 
the defense industry and the broader economy. The chapter covered three broad topics; 1) 
trade barrier effects on revenue, value added, and input use, 2) trade barrier implications the 
efficient use of resources, and 3) trade barrier effects on industry’s localization decisions. I 
now return to these three effects, and assess their likely impact on the Norwegian defense 
industry based on the data collected in the survey and analyzed in 4.1.  
 
4.2.1 Likely effects on revenue, value added, and input use 
Chapter 2.5.1 referenced recent theory from defense economics showing that higher relative 
prices and increased home-biasedness reduces the demand for imported defense articles. 
Figure 4.2 shows which barriers have the potential to decrease volume traded through the 
price-effect and the home-biasedness-effect.  
 
Figure 4.2. Barriers impacting demand for imports 
 
Empirical evidence shows that demand for defense articles is relatively price sensitive (Smith 
& Tasiran, 2005), implying that any barrier that impacts relative prices will have substantial 
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effects on the volume of imports demanded. Of the 16 barriers included in this survey, two 
are aimed at changing relative prices; tariffs (which works as a markup on prices), and the 
Buy American Act (which directs the DOD to add 50 percent to the price of all non-US 
products) (EC, 2008). The results from the survey show that tariffs are rarely encountered. 
Their severity is also low, and they place last out of all 16 barriers in the Final Score ranking. 
This implies that tariffs will have a very limited effect on prices, and likewise on demand and 
revenue. The Buy American Act (BAA) is at the other end of the spectrum; it is ranked first 
according to Final Score. The data thus implies that the BAA does lower the demand for 
Norwegian defense articles. However, as discussed in chapter 4.1.1, the BAAs high ranking 
might be due to a misconception among survey respondents that the BAA includes all 
domestic sourcing regulations. It is also the case that the BAA generally should not apply to 
Norwegian defense articles due to the existence of a reciprocal Memorandum of 
Understanding on defense procurements (see p. 33). These considerations are worth noting, 
but the data nonetheless suggests that the BAA is a high-impact barrier. I conclude that the 
impact of barriers on import demand and revenue through the price-effect is likely to be 
significant, but that this happens primarily through the BAA, and not through tariffs.  It is 
important to keep in mind; however, that defense article pricing is a complex process, 
meaning that any conclusions on the impact of barriers on prices must be drawn with caution. 
 
Home-biasedness appears in a majority of the barriers investigated in this thesis; 10 out of 16 
total. We can look at the relevant barriers in subgroupings: 
 
i. Barriers that explicitly allows for home bias in order to protect and promote domestic 
production: 
These barriers include the Buy American Act (BAA), product-specific domestic 
sourcing restrictions, tariffs and quotas, and set-asides. Of these, the BAA placed 
number 1 in the overall ranking. The remaining barriers ranked 8th, 16th, and 10th, 
respectively. Thus, any effect from explicit home-bias barriers are likely to arise 
largely from the BAA, and to a somewhat lesser extent from other product-specific 
domestic sourcing restrictions and set-asides. Any significant effect from tariffs or 
quotas is unlikely.  
 
ii. Barriers that are put in place for national security reasons: 
These barriers include the usage of ‘no foreign participation’ clauses and security 
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clearance requirements, which rank 9th and 12th, respectively. Any reduction in 
demand arising from these barriers is therefore likely to be fairly moderate.   
 
iii. Informal barriers: 
These include excessive caution in dealing with non-US entities, a lack of will or 
knowledge on behalf of procurement officials, positioning and leveraging by the US 
defense industry, and actions taken by the US Congress. These barriers are ranked 6th, 
3rd, 5th. And 14th, respectively. Thus, with the exception of the US Congress, the data 
implies that informal barriers are likely to have considerable impact on demand for 
imports through the home-bias channel.   
 
While the overall impact of the 10 home-bias related barrier differ, their sheer number imply 
that home-biasedness can be expected to be an important factor in determining traded 
volume. One can also speculate that home-biasedness will increase in the coming months and 
years, as the US government faces steep defense budget cuts and increased pressure to protect 
the domestic industrial base.  
 
4.2.2 Likely implications for the efficient use of resources 
Chapter 2.5.2 showed how barriers render industry unable to reap the benefits of trade by 
denying them the opportunity to realize efficiency gains from specialization and economies 
of scale. Hitch and McKean have estimated that such gains from trade will be bigger in 
defense markets than in other industries due to the fact that defense production is 
characterized by large up-front investments and considerable economies of scale and learning 
(Hitch & McKean, 1960). Any trade barrier that hinders coordination and cooperation 
between American and Norwegian defense companies will decrease the likelihood of these 
potential benefits being realized. Of the barriers examined in this paper, 10 have the potential 
of making cross-border coordination difficult. These are shown in Figure 4.3 below.  
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Figure 4.3. Barriers impacting realization of benefits of trade 
 
 
It is helpful to look at the impact of the 10 relevant barriers in subgroups: 
 
i. Barriers that restrict cross-border movements of data and information:  
These barriers include usage of ‘no foreign participation’ clauses, security clearance 
requirements, difficulty obtaining licenses to export information and technical data, 
and restrictions related to third party transfers and third country nationals. The survey 
data suggests that issues related to obtaining export licenses for technical information 
and data has a relatively large impact; this barrier placed 4th on the Final Score 
ranking. The remaining three barriers placed 9th, 12th, and 11th, respectively, 
suggesting moderate to low relative impact.  
 
ii. Barriers that restrict cross-border movements of products: 
These barriers include issues of re-exportability and obtaining products and supplies. 
Shipping products across borders to allow for testing, integration, or adaptations is 
common when collaborating with US defense companies. Issues with obtaining 
products and supplies from US entities (releaseability-issues) can delay development 
or production, substantially increase costs and reduce competitiveness. These barriers 
ranked 13th and 2nd, respectively. Thus, the data suggests that any efficiency cost 
arising from product movement issues, is likely to arise from difficulties obtaining 
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products and supplies, and not from problems related to re-exportability.   
 
iii. A barrier directly impacting cross-border industrial coordination: 
CFIUS (The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) stands out as 
potentially being a considerable impediment to cross-border collaboration. CFIUS is 
tasked with reviewing foreign ownership and control of sensitive US industry. Cross-
border mergers and acquisitions cannot be completed without approval from CFIUS. 
While we would expect CFIUS to have significant impact due to its direct 
applicability, the data does not support such a hypothesis. CFIUS scored very low on 
measures of both severity and frequency, and placed number 15th on the Final Score 
ranking. I therefore conclude that this barrier is unlikely to cause a significant 
efficiency loss through denying companies access to benefits of specialization and 
economies of scale. 
 
iv. Informal barriers: 
The three barriers in this category include a lack of will or knowledge to consider 
non-US procurement, excessive caution in dealing with non-US entities, and US 
industry positioning and leveraging. These barriers all place in the top half of the 
Final Score ranking (3rd, 6th and 5th, to be precise), implying moderate to high impact. 
 
Free trade allows resources to be used where they are best suited, yielding improved 
efficiency in production, which again reduces scarcity of inputs (because we can produce the 
same with less) and/or outputs (because we can produce more with the same). It is clear that 
producers could benefit greatly from specialization and economies of scale, but the extent to 
which such benefits will be transferred to the broader economy will depend on several 
factors, including the size of the industry that is experiencing efficiency gains. In the case of 
the Norwegian defense sector, the relatively small size of the industry implies that broader 
economic effects are likely to be modest.   
 
4.2.3 Likely effects on industry’s localization decisions  
Chapter 2.5.3 discussed how firms who encounter trade barriers will be more likely to prefer 
establishing operations in the protected market, and referenced empirical work confirming 
that this is a likely result of US defense trade barriers. Relocating operations to the US is 
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promoted through the fact that companies can avoid the cost of certain barriers by operating 
from within the US. This holds true for as many as 12 of the 16 barriers analyzed in this 
thesis. Relocation will have additional implications if technology becomes ‘trapped’ by the 
US export control regime, as described in 2.5.3. The barriers likely to influence location 
decisions, and those that create a ‘one-way’ transfer of technology, are outlined in Figure 4.4 
below. 
 
Figure 4.4. Barriers impacting localization decisions of Norwegian defense industry 
 
 
Due to the fact that as many as 12 of 16 barriers promote the relocation effect, I conclude that 
considerable pressure is placed on Norwegian industry to establish production lines in the 
US. Avoiding the costs associated with these 12 barriers would be of considerable benefit to 
firms willing to relocate operations (provided that their products are able to compete once 
they are introduced i the US market). As pointed out earlier, there is however no guarantee 
that increases in firm revenue will spill over into benefits for the broader Norwegian 
economy.  
 
In addition to implications for sales and profit, Chapter 2.5.3 referenced the effect FDI and 
relocation can have on home country employment. It seems unlikely that relocation of 
defense operations will have substantial effects on the broader Norwegian economy in terms 
of employment. There are several reasons for this; firstly, empirical evidence suggests that 
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while there very well might be a reduction in jobs in the home country when firms move 
operations abroad, this can be offset if the foreign investment leads to a substantial growth in 
sales (Kokko, 2006). This is certainly the case for Norway’s two largest defense companies, 
who both have operations in the US. Both Kongsberg Defense Systems and the Nammo 
Group have seen their US subsidiaries win very large contracts in the US (DOD, 2008, 
2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2010). Secondly, as we saw in Chapter 1, the Norwegian 
defense industry as a whole accounts for a very modest proportion of overall employment in 
Norway. Thus, any job loss within the defense industry is likely to have small or negligible 
effects on the state of national employment. The fact that the Norwegian defense industry is 
highly centralized around a few industrial hubs (NDRE, 2007), suggests however, that effects 
may be more noticeable in local communities. Lastly, it is less likely that any job loss 
resulting from relocation of operations feed into long-term unemployment, as the 
unemployment rate in Norway is currently low (OECD, 2013), and that the demand for 
skilled labor (especially for engineers) is expected to stay high for some time (Gjefsen, 
Gjelsvik, Roksvaag, & Stølen, 2012).   
 
Chapter 2.5.3 also described how benefits of relocation in terms of technology transfers are 
limited within the defense industry due to restrictions on cross-border transfers of technology. 
This is particularly true in the US, where the export control system covers any article that is 
“specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted, or modified for a military 
application” (CFR, 2013), implying that technology that undergoes even minor modifications 
after being brought to the US from Norway cannot be brought out of the US without explicit 
permission from the US Government. The combination of relocating Norwegian industry to 
the US and the American export control regime could result in a one-way transfer of 
technology; moving technologies and resources from Norway to the US, but not in the other 
direction. Whether or not such a one-way transfer structure would materialize depends on the 
severity of barriers to re-export. The total respondent group did not assign much relative 
importance to the barrier of re-export; it placed 13th on Final Score ranking. However, this 
outlook changes somewhat when one considers companies who have operations in the US 
(Subgroup 1 from chapter 4.1.2). While Subgroup 2 and 3 gave re-exportability-issues a 
severity score of 0.06 and 0.00, respectively, Subgroup 1 assigned it 0.12. This is compared 
to Subgroups 2 and 3, but still below Subgroup 1’s own average severity score, which was 
0.20. Should more companies move into Subgroup 1 through relocation of production, it is 
reasonable to expect that the overall score of re-exportability will increase, however this 
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increase might only be moderate. It is therefore difficult to predict whether or not a one-way 
technology transfer structure would materialize and how detrimental it would be. However, it 
is clear that even small restrictions on technology transfers would be a disadvantage to 
Norwegian firms, and would also limit the potential benefits of technology spillover to the 
broader economy.  
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5 Concluding Remarks 
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the extent to which Norwegian companies encounter 
trade barriers on foreign markets, looking specifically at the case of the Norwegian defense 
industry and the US market. Relevant barriers were identified through in-depth interviews, 
and quantitative data was collected through a survey of Norwegian defense companies. Data 
was analyzed along two parameters; frequency and severity, and the product of the two was 
used to rank the barriers according to their overall impact, or Final Score.  
 
The survey data allowed for a ranking of the barriers by overall impact. This ranking revealed 
three findings: 
 
1. There seems to be a discrepancy between regulations and reality: 
While the Buy American Act (BAA) should not apply to Norwegian end products, 
companies reported that encounters were both frequent and difficult to deal with. This 
result may be partly attributable to a misconception among survey respondents that 
any domestic sourcing restriction is part of the BAA, however it seems unlikely that 
such a misconception can explain every instance. This discrepancy once again 
illustrates the value of collecting detailed information directly from the individuals 
who deal with these issues, rather than relying on written regulations.  
 
2. High-impact barriers are often a bi-product of (more or less) unrelated regulations:  
As the data shows, the US export control regime is considered a major obstacle for 
Norwegian defense companies looking to sell goods and technology on the US 
market. This is especially true when it comes to bringing products, supplies, and 
technical data from the US to Norway. While these externalities of the US export 
control regime may be unintended, their effects are nonetheless very real.   
 
3. Informal barriers are important: 
The companies placed informal barriers in 4 of the top 10 spots in the Final Score 
ranking. Of particular interest is it that the two barriers related to informal actions 
taken by the US defense industry both ranked among the top 6.  
49 
The analysis of the survey data also revealed considerable variation between subgroups of 
different involvement levels in the US. I concluded that it is companies with the most direct 
involvement in the US that assign barriers both the highest frequency and the highest 
severity. The data does not seem to support the hypothesis that the limited resources and 
experience of smaller, less involved companies, makes barriers more difficult to deal with, 
compared to their larger, more involved counterparts.  
 
Next, three further effects of trade barriers were analyzed: 
 
1. Effects of barriers on revenue, value added, and input use: 
Theory suggests that revenue of firms will be negatively impacted by trade 
barriers, as they can lower both prices received and the amount of goods sold. The 
data suggested that any downward pressure on demand for Norwegian goods 
through the price-effect is likely to happen through the Buy American Act. 
Reduced demand due to home-biasedness is likely, as it appears in as many as 10 
of the 16 barriers. Reduced revenue implies that companies see their own budget 
constraints change, likely impacting internal decisions on employment, R&D 
activity, production, etc. While such changes have the potential to impact the 
broader Norwegian economy, the magnitude of any such effect is likely moderate, 
due to the relatively small size of the defense industry. The high level of 
centralization of the defense industry does, however, imply that there would be 
more noticeable effects in the local communities in which the defense hubs are 
situated.  
 
2. Effects of trade barriers on the efficient use of resources: 
Theory showed how production efficiency is improved under trade due to 
specialization and economies of scale. This of course, means that there are 
efficiency costs from restricting trade. Empirical evidence suggests that such costs 
would be particularly large in the defense industry. A large number (10) of the 
barriers analyzed in this thesis have such efficiency costs effects; and informal 
barriers and issues with exports of products and supplies, as well as technical 
information and data, was found to be of particular importance. The relatively 
small size of the industry implies that broader economic effects are likely to be 
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modest. 
 
 
3. Effects on localization decisions: 
The survey results suggest that there exists considerate pressure on Norwegian 
defense companies to relocate operations to the US. Relocation is likely to be very 
beneficial for companies, as they could circumvent a large number of barriers. It is 
not guaranteed; however, that such benefits would have spillover effects for the 
Norwegian economy, and thus benefits for the broader economy are difficult to 
estimate. Relocation, combined with the US export control regime, could also 
result in a one-way transfer of technology, implying that return on technology 
investment would be severely limited.  
 
This thesis has revealed that trade barriers are still very much present in the case of the 
Norwegian defense industry vis-à-vis the US market. Applying the methodology used in this 
thesis to other markets and other Norwegian industries could certainly be an interesting topic 
for future research.  
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Appendix 1. The Business Survey 
Business Survey - Trade Barriers Faced by the Norwegian Defense Industry 
 
Part I. Introduction and General Information 
This part of the survey consists of 7 questions related to your company profile and 
international business. 
 
Question 1. Please indicate your main defense-related product line  
o C4ISR, Radars, Sensors, Electro-optics, Other Electronic Equipment. 
o Camp infrastructure and field rations (shelter, camouflage, tents, food, clothing, 
medical facilities and equipment, decontamination etc.)  
o Consulting, Research and Development, and other services  
o Ground, Air, Surface, and Underwater Vehicles, and other platform-related equipment 
and parts 
o Logistics and Logistics support  
o Simulation, Education, Training, Testing, Test Equipment and Test Facilities  
o Software, Electronic Warfare Systems or Equipment, Data Protection and Security, 
o Multiprocessing Systems, Identification and Tracking  
o Systems Integration and Architecture 
o Weapons and Weapon systems, Accessories & Ammunition, Missile technology, 
o Explosives and Propellants  
o Other 
Question 2. Please indicate your company's number of employees  
o 1 – 19 employees 
o 20 – 99 employees 
o 100 employees or more 
Question 3. Please note the approximate percentage of your company’s sales that derive from 
each of the following countries/regions. 
  
 
Question 4. There are several types of barriers to trade, including formal (e.g. domestic 
content restrictions or quotas), informal (e.g. a lack of knowledge among contracting officers 
or unclear regulations) or cultural (e.g. language problems or differing business cultures). If 
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all barriers to trade were to disappear, how would you expect the distribution listed in the 
previous question to look? 
  
 
Question 5. What was your company’s defense-related revenue in 2012? Please make sure to 
note which currency you are using (e.g. NOK, USD, EUR etc.). Approximate numbers are 
sufficient.  
Question 6. What would you expect your annual defense-related revenue to be if all barriers 
to trade were to disappear? Please make sure to note which currency you are using (e.g. 
NOK, USD, EUR etc.). Approximate numbers are sufficient.  
Question 7. What is the extent of your business activities on the United States market? Please 
check all that apply.  
o My company has established production facilities in the US  
o My company has bought a US company or established a new company incorporated 
in the US 
o My company has licensing agreement or similar arrangement with a US company, 
allowing for production of our products within the US 
o My company has a sales office or other non-production related representation in the 
US 
o My company exports from Norwegian (or other non-US) production facilities to the 
United States 
o My company has considered/is looking into the possibility of doing business with a 
US entity 
o My company does not, and does not intend to do business with a US entity 
o None of the above 
 
 
Part II. Barriers to Trade - Formal and Informal 
In this part you will be asked questions about 11 formal and 5 informal barriers to trade. A 
formal barrier to trade is one that is based on laws and regulations. An informal barrier is one 
that is not based on law or regulation, but rater on intangibles such as culture, knowledge, 
will etc. Please note that the focus of Part II (and the remainder of this survey) will be on 
doing defense-related business with United States entities. Therefore, please refrain from 
answering based on experience in non-defense markets or with strictly non-US entities. If 
you do not currently do business in the US market directly I still urge you to complete the 
survey, as there might be useful information in your answers nonetheless. Your company 
58 
may for instance be a sub-supplier for another Norwegian firm that deals directly with US 
entities and your input will therefore be valuable for this project.  
 
Barrier 1/16. Domestic Sourcing Restriction: Buy American Act 
The Buy American Act allows US procurement officials to give preference to goods and 
services produced within the United States. (41 United States Code §10a – 10d). 
 
a. Has your company encountered the Buy American Act when looking to do business on 
the US market? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 2/16. Product-Specific Domestic Sourcing Restrictions 
While the Buy American Act covers a multitude of goods and services, other domestic 
sourcing restrictions are more specific. Examples of specific domestic sourcing restrictions 
include for instance: 
• The Berry Amendment – gives preference to US companies when the DOD procures 
textiles and certain food products 
• Specialty Metals - gives preference to US companies when the DOD procures certain 
metals and alloys 
• Restriction on ‘Miscellaneous Goods’ (10 USC Sec 2534) - gives preference to US 
companies when the DOD procures buses, components for naval vessels, bearings, 
valves and machine tools 
• US Department of Agriculture restriction on import of food products 
 
a. Has your company encountered any such product-specific domestic sourcing restrictions 
when looking to sell your products to a US entity? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 
'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
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b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 3/16. Usage of ‘no foreign participation’ clauses 
The US has a system of markings that can restrict a document from being released to foreign 
entities. Examples of markings can be ‘NOFORN’ or ‘NF’. Examples of restricted 
documents can be bid or contract documents, technical specifications or calls for tender, etc. 
Industry days are also sometimes closed to foreign participation. 
 
a. Has your company encountered any problems obtaining documents or attending events 
due to the usage of such markings when looking to sell your products to a US entity? If 
'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 4/16. Security Clearance Requirements 
Some contracts or competitions may require that production facilities and/or personnel 
working on the project have certain types of security clearances that are difficult or 
impossible for foreign companies to obtain. 
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a. Has your company encountered such security clearance restrictions when looking to sell 
your products to a US entity? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 5/16. Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) 
The Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) reviews transactions 
that can lead to a non-US person controlling a US company (typically through mergers and 
acquisitions). 
 
a. Has your company encountered the CFIUS when looking to do business in the United 
States? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
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Barrier 6/16. Traditional barriers to trade – tariffs and quotas 
Tariffs are simply put taxes levied on imports, thereby raising the cost of foreign-made 
products. Import quotas are volume restrictions that limit the amount of a good that can be 
brought into the US. 
 
a. Has your company encountered tariffs, import quotas, and/or a mix of the two when 
looking to sell your products to a US entity? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not 
applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 7/16. ITAR & Export Control 1: Re-exportability 
The United States Export Control Regime lays down strict rules for the export of defense-
related products, services, and technology. Foreign technology or products that are brought to 
the US and that are modified, adapted, or in any way changed while in the US will be under 
the jurisdiction of US law. This creates a potential problem for foreign companies who want 
to bring their products or technology back out of the US, even if they simply want to bring it 
home to the originating country. 
 
a. Has your company encountered such problems with re-exportability when looking to do 
business on the US defense market? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not 
applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
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o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 8/16. ITAR & Export Control 2: Licenses to export information and technical 
data 
The United States Export Control Regime considers any transfer of technology or technical 
details as an export. This implies that a US and a foreign company that wish to collaborate 
will need approval from the State Department before technical discussions can begin. This is 
normally obtained through a TAA (Technical Assistance Agreement), a MLA 
(Manufacturing License Agreement) or a DSP-5 (license for permanent export of unclassified 
defense articles and related technical data). 
 
a. Has your company encountered problems with obtaining a TAA, MLA or DSP-5 or 
found that the process of obtaining such a license is time-consuming, confusing, or 
difficult? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 9/16. ITAR & Export Control 3: Attaining products and supplies 
The United States Export Control Regime lays down strict rules for the export of products, 
services, and technology related to defense. This may cause difficulty in obtaining products 
or technology from US suppliers, partners, or affiliates. Examples of when this might be an 
issue can be when a company wishes to test, adapt, or do integration work on US products at 
a Norwegian facility, or when the inclusion of US parts is a contract requirement. 
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a. Has your company encountered problems with gaining access to products from a US 
supplier, partner, affiliate etc? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 10/16. ITAR & Export Control 4: Third Party Transfers and Third Country 
Nationals 
The United States Export Control Regime lays down strict rules to prevent military products 
and technology from spreading further than the intended end-user. This can become a 
problem for companies that for instance wish to sell products with integrated US parts to 
other countries. The US government may require a special clearance such as a DSP-83 or 
some sort of guarantee from the Norwegian Government. An additional problem arises 
because sharing technical information with an individual counts as an export to the country of 
which this individual is a citizen. This can be an issue for Norwegian companies that wish to 
bring someone who is not a US and not a Norwegian citizen onto a program where restricted 
data is shared. 
 
a. Has your company encountered problems with Third Party Transfers or Third Country 
Nationals? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
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o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 11/16. Set-asides 
In some cases programs or projects are only awarded to certain types of businesses. One 
example of such a set-aside is a contract that is only open to small US companies (Small 
Business Preference Programs). 
 
a. Has your company encountered problems with set-asides when looking to do business on 
the US defense market? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 12/16. Lack of will or knowledge 
US procurement officials and program managers (whether in a US governmental agency or in 
a private US company) may not have sufficient knowledge about the possibility of procuring 
defense-related articles from non-US sources. Some might also lack the willingness to look 
abroad for procurement alternatives. 
 
a. Has your company encountered such lack of will or knowledge when trying to do 
business with a US entity? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
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o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 13/16. Lack of certainty and clarity 
US laws and regulations pertaining to trade in defense-related goods, services, and 
technology are complex and vast. Navigating and understanding the rules can be time-
consuming and difficult. In certain cases there is additional uncertainty when the rules and 
regulations themselves are vague or open for interpretation. 
a. Has your company encountered such a lack of clarity and/or certainty, or found that 
identifying and navigating the relevant laws and regulations has been a considerable 
barrier? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 14/16. US industry 1: Positioning and leveraging 
In certain instances US industry might have incentives to try to limit the access foreign 
companies have to defense-programs and the market. Here, US industry includes companies 
that are competitors to Norwegian firms, as well as suppliers, affiliates, partners, dealers or 
vendors. 
 
a. Has your company experienced that US industry (competitors, suppliers, affiliates, 
partners, dealers, vendors etc.) actively try to limit your access to competitions, bids, 
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and/or the market in general? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
Barrier 15/16. US industry 2: Excessive caution related to foreign entities 
A strict and complex export control regime coupled with severe consequences for non-
compliance may lead some US companies to be overly cautious and take on a ‘better safe 
than sorry’ approach when it comes to dealing with foreign entities. 
 
a. Has your company experienced that US industry acts overly cautious when it comes to 
dealing with foreign entities? If 'No' or 'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in 
question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
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Barrier 16/16. The US Congress 
Having support from Members of Congress can be of the utmost importance for any firm 
looking to be successful on the US defense market, especially since Congress ultimately 
decides whether or not a program will be funded. Congress can also create pressure to 
procure only US-made products, services, and technology. 
 
a. Has your company experienced that there has been a lack of support from the US 
Congress, and/or the presence of pressure to limit procurement to US sources? If 'No' or 
'Do not know', please check 'Not applicable' in question b.  
o Yes 
o No 
o Do not know 
 
b. What was the final outcome of the process? Please check all that apply. Note; if you have 
encountered this barrier on multiple occasions, please consider the most recent case. 
o Issue was solved on its own/with time 
o Issue was solved with limited additional paperwork 
o Issue was solved with considerable additional paperwork, legal support, and/or 
direct negotiations with customer or US government entity 
o Issue was solved with support from a US entity (e.g. US industry, Department 
of Defense, (including OCT or Military Services), Congress) 
o Issue was solved with Norwegian Gov't support (e.g. the Armed Forces, 
Ministry of Defense, Innovation Norway, or Norwegian Embassy) 
o Issue was brought to court 
o Issue remains unsolved 
o Project was terminated 
o Other 
o Not applicable 
 
 
Part III. Overall View 
While the impact of one single barrier might be small, the aggregated impact may be 
substantial. I would therefore like to ask three additional questions about your company’s 
overall experience with trade barriers in the US defense market. 
 
Question 8. Considering the barriers discussed above, as well as any barriers you have 
experienced but that has not been covered by this survey, please check the box that best 
describes the experience your company has had with barriers to trade on the US market.  
o Problems were negligible  
o Easily manageable  
o Manageable  
o A considerable challenge 
o Severely time-consuming and costly 
o Troublesome to the point where the US market is no longer considered to be a viable 
business opportunity 
o Not applicable, company has done no business with US entities 
 
Question 9. Has your company encountered any significant barriers to trade that have not 
been covered in this survey? 
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Question 10. What types of issues do you think the Norwegian Government could do more to 
help resolve? Do you have any other recommendations? 
 
 
 	  	  	  
 
